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Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
in the Twentieth Century
Juan Cole
Iraq and Israel/Palestine may on the surface appear to be very dif-
ferent societies with little in common. Iraq has its Kurds, Sunni Arabs, 
and Shiites, and its modern history has been a struggle over monarchy, 
republicanism, and the one-party state. Israel and Palestine are Jew-
ish, Sunni Arab, and Christian Arab, and their central struggle has 
been over the shape of the Zionist state and the question of Palestinian 
statelessness. Iraq is a hydrocarbon state, while Israel and Palestine 
have diverse economies. The two can fruitfully be viewed through 
the same prism in two ways, however. On a comparative level, they 
share much in common, being multi-ethnic states with a background 
in Ottoman and British colonial administrative practices. Their fragil-
ity and ethnic instability have driven both internal civil wars and wars 
with neighbors. They have also had an important impact upon one 
another. The rise of Zionism in the Middle East and the Arab rejection 
of it robbed Iraq of its vibrant and influential Jewish community, with 
fateful results. It also displaced thousands of Palestinians to Iraq and 
hundreds of thousands to neighboring Kuwait. Iraqi troops fought 
Israel, with Iraq supporting its Palestinian foes. The Palestinians of 
Kuwait were further displaced by the Gulf War, and those of Iraq had 
to flee to Jordan and Palestine after 2003. The Israel lobby in the United 
States was one important mover in fomenting the 2003 U.S. overthrow 
of the Iraqi government, which propelled Iraq into chaos.
Iraq as a modern state was created by much the same processes that 
brought into being Israel and Palestine.1 In the 19th century, both Iraq 
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and Israel/Palestine consisted of a set of Ottoman administrative dis-
tricts. Both were conquered by the British military during World War 
I, after the Ottoman sultan threw in with Germany and Austria and 
declared war on the French, British, and Russian empires. Both were 
cobbled together into a colonial apparatus first administered by the 
British army, then reorganized as a League of Nations Mandate. British 
colonial policies of ethnic favoritism and divide-and-rule benefited the 
Sunni Arabs of Iraq and the Zionist settlers of Palestine. These policies 
arguably had a very long-term impact in setting the stage for protracted 
civil wars, sometimes latent and sometimes hot, in both societies. Both 
illustrate the ways in which European colonialism profoundly shaped 
the modern Middle East, imposing the state frameworks within which 
ethnic competition was worked out. They also demonstrate how cen-
tral the Israeli-Arab conflict has been to the fortunes of Middle Eastern 
governments.
The British made two promises during World War I, with tragic con-
sequences for the Middle East. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 pledged 
to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine, which, the pompous commit-
ment intoned, would miraculously avoid inconveniencing what were 
to be more than a million native inhabitants by the time the promise 
was fulfilled. A year earlier, the British Arab Bureau in Cairo had given 
Sharif Husayn, a Hashemite of Mecca, the impression that the British 
would support an Arab kingdom if the Arabs went into revolt against 
the Ottoman Empire. At around the same time, the Foreign Office in 
London was giving away Jerusalem to the Russians and greater Syria 
to the French, while envisaging British dominance of Iraq and the rest 
of Palestine. Lenin came to power in Russia and published the salacious 
details of the secret plot, pulling the new Soviet state out of it. The Brit-
ish on the ground were embarrassed about the double dealings, and 
connived at allowing the Arab forces, led by Abdullah’s son Faysal, to 
reach Damascus before the British as they pushed the Ottoman forces 
back. Faysal initially claimed Syria, but when France invaded to claim 
its prize, Britain bestowed Iraq on Faysal in recompense, making him 
king in Baghdad. His brother, Abdullah, was awarded the Transjordan 
by the British, who kept the West Bank and geographical Palestine for 
their Mandate. Both Faysal and Abdullah were scions of the House of 
the Prophet Muhammad in Mecca, claiming a lineage that went back 
to Hashem b. Manaf, his great-grandfather. They were thus referred to 
as “Hashemites.”
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King Abdullah in Jordan and Faysal and his descendants in Iraq 
continued to dream of an Arab kingdom greater than the ones they 
possessed. They plotted to expand their realms when, as they foresaw 
must happen, the European Mandates drew to a close. Iraqi leaders 
hoped to pick up Kuwait and Palestine when the British left, and Syria 
upon the French departure. Abdullah in Jordan had his eye on Pales-
tine, Syria, and Lebanon. The Hashemites therefore found the British 
plan to give away Palestine to Central and Eastern European Zionist 
settlers extremely inconvenient. In Iraq, Faysal (d. 1933), his successor 
King Ghazi (d. 1939), and the latter’s successor, the regent Prince Abd 
al-Ilah (d. 1958), all took a strong stand against Jewish immigration 
into British Palestine and the potential displacement of the Palestinians 
it threatened to provoke. Iraqi Pan-Arabists felt more strongly about 
this issue than did the politicians with a strictly Iraqi nationalist orien-
tation. Typical Pan-Arab policy on this issue was outlined in interviews 
with the Egyptian press by Prime Minister Jamil Midfa‘i in 1937, when 
he said, “Palestine is a part of Arabia and we cannot agree to its being 
detached therefrom. We shall make every effort to see that the rights 
of our Palestinian brethren are upheld.”2 Iraq sent arms and money 
to Palestinians during the 1936–1939 revolt. It also sent delegations to 
diplomatic conferences on the future of Palestine, where it pressed this 
line. Iraq had a further interest in the disposition of Palestine because 
of the oil pipeline to Haifa, opened in 1935.3
Iraq not only had a policy toward Palestine, it had its own significant 
Jewish community, estimated at a third of Baghdad’s population. Iraqi 
Jews until the 1940s were for the most part uninterested in Zionism, 
and instead considered themselves Arabs of Jewish heritage.4 Labor 
Zionism, with its emphasis on Jewish nationalism, socialism, and agri-
cultural labor, developed in response to discrimination against Jews in 
Poland and Russia, where they were frequently forced into professions 
like peddling because they were forbidden to own much in the way 
of real estate. Baghdad’s Jewish artisans, merchants, shopkeepers, and 
intellectuals had little interest in farm life, and many of those interested 
in socialism, from 1936, gravitated to the Communist Party of Iraq 
with other Iraqi leftists. Although Iraqi Jews faced occasional discrimi-
nation, and a quota was instituted in the 1930s setting the proportion 
of places they could take in the bureaucracy and schools, in interviews 
and as writers they expressed fulfillment as citizens of Iraq.
It is sometimes alleged that German anti-Semitism had an impact on 
places like Egypt and Iraq in the 1930s. While some Iraqis were will-
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ing to seek political alliances with Axis powers on a pragmatic basis, 
there is no solid evidence for the charge of ideological influence in con-
temporary mainstream newspapers or diplomatic accounts.5 British 
Ambassador to Iraq Basil Newton observed in 1940 that with respect 
to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance of 1930, the Nuri al-Said govern-
ment, although it did not go so far as to declare war on Germany in 
September of 1939, “did at once take all the measures (such as breaking 
off diplomatic and trade relations with Germany, interning German 
nationals and guarding the essential lines of communications) which 
they were obliged to take if they were to fulfill the obligations of the 
treaty.”6 He observed that the main reasons for Baghdad’s reluctance 
to declare war were a fear that the country’s military was unprepared 
and an anxiety about being seen as a British satellite regime at a time 
when tensions were high over the Palestine issue. The idea of Iraqi 
tribal levies being sent to fight Germans on behalf of Britain also risked 
provoking unrest among the tribes of southern Iraq. Newton said that 
the German invasion of Poland produced widespread “revulsion,” 
and added, “While not losing sight of their former conception of the 
Arabs chafing under the ‘tutelage’ of the great Western democracies, 
the Iraqis have recognised quite clearly the definite menace of Hitler-
ism and are anxious to see it defeated, although they hope that Britain 
and France may find it expedient, during or as a result of the war, to 
accord full independence and self-determination to the Arabs of Pales-
tine and Syria.”7
*****
To the extent that Muslim and Christian Arabs grew suspicious of 
Jews in the late 1930s, the misgivings were fuelled by the 1936–1939 
Palestinian revolt against the British policy of facilitating further Jew-
ish immigration. Anti-colonialism, nationalism, and the Palestine issue 
came together in the minds of many in the Iraqi public. When Iraq’s 
King Ghazi died in an automobile accident on April 4, 1939, a crowd in 
the northern city of Mosul burned the British consulate and murdered 
the consul, convinced that the monarch’s death had been plotted in 
London. The new consul, C.G. Summerhayes, reported to Baghdad 
that, “this town has an awkward population and the feeling is not gen-
erally friendly, owing mainly to propaganda about Palestine.” He was 
convinced that the activities of the local “Palestine Defence League” 
had had a “cumulative” impact.8
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In 1940, the nationalist Rashid Ali Gaylani became prime minister 
for a second time. During that year, he continued the boycott of Nazi 
Germany and was said to have paid “some heed to the lessons about 
internal treachery taught by Norway and the Netherlands.”9 Gaylani, 
however, declined to allow British troops to cross Iraqi territory for war 
purposes and refused to act against fascist Italy when it declared war 
on Britain that year, adopting a new slogan of neutrality. In summer 
1940, Gaylani and his clique sent a cabinet minister to contact German 
Ambassador to Turkey Franz von Papen.10 The staunchly pro-British 
Nuri al-Said, however, had attempted to contact Germany for similar 
reasons in the spring of 1940, seeking guarantees of Iraqi independence 
before he had to step down, so the Gaylani policy was no departure.11 
Late in 1940, Gaylani and his supporters were intrigued by Hitler’s 
pledge to preserve the independence of the Arab states and to end the 
British and French colonial regimes in Palestine and Syria, respectively. 
Arab nationalists who pursued such links with the fascist states were 
not typically influenced by fascist ideas, about which they remained 
largely ignorant. They simply sought another Great Power that could 
check the British. Nuri al-Said, still in the cabinet and committed to 
the alliance with Britain, was appalled by these moves and worked 
with the British and pro-British Iraqi politicians to undermine Gaylani, 
unseating him on January 31, 1941, in favor of Taha al-Hashimi. Al-
Hashimi proved no more willing to cut off ties with Mussolini’s Italy 
than had Gaylani, suggesting that the attempt to maintain a modicum 
of neutrality was a shared goal among top Iraqi politicians, with the 
possible exception of Nuri al-Said.
In April, Gaylani and his supporters in the Iraqi military effected a 
coup and forced the regent, Abd al-Ilah, into exile. Although the Brit-
ish charged Gaylani with Axis sympathies, his government reaffirmed 
the 1930 treaty with Britain and simply pursued neutrality (that Gay-
lani sought German and Italian weaponry so as to escape complete 
dependence on Britain was consistent with that quest for neutrality). It 
is natural that to a government such as Churchill’s, locked in a deadly 
struggle with a powerful enemy, Iraqi neutrality would have appeared 
like an active alliance with Germany. Yet it is odd that subsequent his-
torians have seldom escaped from the vocabulary of wartime propa-
ganda. Many even speak of Gaylani as “pro-Nazi,” which is certainly 
incorrect during this period.
Turkey and Yemen, not to mention the United States, also main-
tained neutrality with regard to the Axis. Switzerland, while neutral, 
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actually allowed the sale of arms to Germany, so it seems a little unfair 
that the Swiss Federal Council of the time should be lauded for pluck 
in its resistance to Germany while Gaylani is demonized. Sweden, 
also neutral, was part of the Nazi economic system until 1943 in a 
way the Iraqi coup-makers appear not even to have dreamed about. 
Gaylani insisted that his coup was a domestic political movement with 
no implications for foreign policy. In spring of 1941, he sought formal 
recognition from Britain and allowed transit of some British troops to 
Palestine from Basra, hardly the actions of an Axis ally.12 As a national-
ist, he did attempt to curb Britain’s military freedom of movement in 
Iraq, including at the Royal Air Force base at Habbaniyyah. Germany 
dithered in the face of Iraqi pleas for arms, and the Vichy govern-
ment initially showed little enthusiasm for allowing Syria to be used to 
transship weaponry.13
Far from the April 1941 coup telling us anything about Iraqi public 
opinion, the British ambassador observed that, “In most liwas [prov-
inces], except Diwaniya and Kerbala, the tribal attitude is generally 
one of indifference.”14 Some in the educated classes decried the coup 
as unconstitutional: “The Shiah divines of the Holy Cities have so 
far refused to declare in favor of the new regime.” That is, from an 
informed British perspective, the Rashid Ali government was not 
greeted with overwhelming enthusiasm by the Iraqi populace or the 
religious authorities.
In May 1941, Churchill sent British forces to invade Iraq and restore 
the regent. At this point, Iraqi politicians and officers sought German 
help with more urgency, and the Vichy government agreed, too late, 
to the use of Syria for logistics. The British quickly deposed the Iraqi 
government. Rashid Ali took refuge in Germany, placing himself at its 
disposal, but it would be anachronistic to read back his later despera-
tion as an exile into his actions while still in Iraq. At the end of the war, 
he fled to Saudi Arabia.
On Emir Abd al-Ilah’s return to the capital on June 1, delegations of 
monarchist Iraqis paid their respects, including a group from the Jew-
ish community. Rumors flew in Baghdad that Iraqi Jews had colluded 
with Britain to overthrow the Iraqi government, and nationalist mobs 
attacked them. Some 200 were killed, hundreds wounded, and three 
million dollars in property damage was inflicted over two days of riot-
ing. Iraqi troops intervened, and the British ambassador estimated that 
they killed as many of the rioters as the latter did of Jews. A military 
tribunal swiftly tried and meted out severe sentences to some of the 
ringleaders in the crowd.15
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Although the British and Zionists tended to blame the anti-Jewish 
action on German propaganda, it is not clear that Berlin ever had much 
real influence in Iraq. Few Iraqis had radios in those days before the 
transistor and the literacy rate was low. German ideas would have had 
difficulty finding a large audience. Certainly, there were not thousands 
of Baghdadis willing and able to form a crowd on the basis of pro-Ger-
man sentiment. It is more accurate to see the anti-Jewish riot as an Iraqi 
protest against being recolonized by the British. Given that the British 
and the Zionist Jews were joint partners in the colonization of Pales-
tine, the symbolic logic of the crowd saw them as such in Baghdad as 
well. The attempt to explain Arab frustrations with reference to Nazi 
pamphleteering, quite aside from being unsupported by compelling 
evidence and implausible on the face of it, has the unfortunate effect 
of making it more difficult to see the Middle Eastern context of this 
Middle Eastern event. Nativist rioting against minorities as a form 
of anti-colonialism has been common in modern history. The attack, 
horrible as it was, did not point to a sea change in the situation of 
Iraqi Jews at that time, which returned to normal under subsequent 
Iraqi governments through 1948. The pogrom or “farhud” of 1941 did, 
however, impel some Iraqi Jews to take an interest in Zionism. Zion-
ists themselves stepped up attempts to recruit Iraqi Jews to the cause 
because further Jewish immigration from Europe was blocked after 
1940. Most Iraqi Jews, however, remained Iraqi nationalists or joined 
the Communist Party until much later in that decade.
In the 1940s, King Abdullah of Jordan found a silver lining in the 
Palestine crisis for his territorial ambitions. In private, he increasingly 
seemed to accept the idea of partitioning Palestine in hopes that the 
Palestinians could then be incorporated into the Hashemite King-
dom of Jordan. This stance, and his secret negotiations with Zionist 
leaders, brought him into bad repute in the newly established Arab 
League, which instead supported a Palestinian state encompassing all 
of Palestine. In 1948, Abdullah took a more aggressive stance, appar-
ently hoping to incorporate all of Palestine into Jordan, while allowing 
for “autonomy for the Jewish parts.”16 Still, a Jordanian eyewitness 
maintained that he pledged that Jordanian and Iraqi forces would not 
engage Zionist ones inside the area designated for Israel by the United 
Nations.17
Emir Abd al-Ilah of Iraq sent 3,000 Iraqi troops to Jordan to support 
Abdullah, but despite the Iraqi government’s aggressive rhetoric, they 
stayed in the West Bank and did not attack the Zionist-held territory 
awarded by the United Nations.18 Iraq later sent another 10,000 troops 
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to protect the other Hashemite kingdom, although Abdullah’s deter-
mination to simply incorporate the West Bank into his realm gradually 
soured Iraqi politicians on him.
Palestinian villagers around Haifa and Jaffa at first fought encroach-
ing Zionist forces as irregulars, but were defeated and fled to Jenin in 
the West Bank, where the Iraqi army protected them. Iraq evacuated 
the women and children to Baghdad, and formed the men into a unit 
of the Iraqi Army, which they dubbed the Carmel Brigade. When Iraqi 
forces left for home late in 1948, they brought 4,000 Palestinians of the 
Carmel Brigade with them.19
The defeat of the Egyptian forces, the emergence of Israel, the expul-
sion by Zionist forces of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from 
their homes, and the dislocations of the war had a profound impact 
on Iraq. Arab Iraqis sympathized wholeheartedly with the displaced 
Palestinians. Many Muslim Iraqis blamed Jews in general for the catas-
trophe, although given the distinct lack of enthusiasm for Zionism 
characteristic of most Iraqi Jews, this attitude was most unfair.
Beginning in 1947, the government fired some Jewish civil servants 
and at first put restrictions on their emigration from Iraq, lest they go 
to Israel and strengthen it. Later on, it rethought this policy, apparently 
fearing a Zionist fifth column in Mesopotamia. After 1950, attacks on 
Jews and synagogues proliferated. Leftist Iraqi Jews have charged that 
some attacks were actually orchestrated by Zionists who hoped to con-
vince Iraqi Jews to emigrate to Israel. The fog of war makes it difficult 
for a historian to adjudicate such claims, but two points are in order. 
The first is that the charges are credible and that nationalists have 
throughout modern history repeatedly deployed such dirty tactics in 
order to consolidate populations in a compact territory. Iraqi Jewish 
eyewitnesses of the bombings maintained that Zionists were respon-
sible. The second point is that any such activities by Zionist saboteurs 
is unlikely to account for the emigration of 120,000 Iraqi Jews from Iraq 
over three years. Anxiety about government discrimination, the inse-
curity of Jewish property, and the fear of getting trapped in a hostile 
Iraq in all likelihood contributed to the panic much more than did a 
few bombings.20
By 1953, only 10,000 Jews were left in Iraq. Conditions for them 
improved under the nationalist government of Abdul Karim Qasim 
from 1958. The loss of most Iraqi Jews warped Iraqi society, depriving 
it of a key urban population and an important multicultural element. 
The wealthier Jews in Baghdad had had strong links to the Alliance 
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Française (dedicated to French public diplomacy) and to international 
commerce. Jewish intellectuals had made disproportionate contribu-
tions to the Iraqi Communist Party. Both bourgeois cosmopolitanism 
and international socialism in Iraq were weakened.
Kurds and Shiites were largely (though by no means entirely) rural. 
In the aftermath of Baghdad’s transformation into an almost wholly 
Sunni Muslim city in the 1950s, the literate, urban Sunni middle classes 
were better able to pursue a Sunni-tinged Arab nationalism of an insu-
lar and triumphalist sort.
The orchestrated attack by Britain, France, and Israel on Egypt in 
1956 created an irreparable fissure between the Iraqi public and the 
government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, well known for his pro-
British sympathies. He had taken Iraq into the anti-Soviet Baghdad Pact 
with Britain, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan in 1955, at a time when Egypt’s 
charismatic Gamal Abdel Nasser was championing the Non-Aligned 
Movement and anti-colonialism. The Iraqi government’s refusal to 
come to Egypt’s aid was extremely unpopular. In November of 1956, 
students in Baghdad organized repeated demonstrations, and British 
Ambassador Sir Michael Wright reported “serious and widespread 
disquiet.”21 The Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline through Syria was 
bombed, harming the government’s finances for months and reducing 
its ability to provide services and keep clients happy. A demonstration 
in the Shiite holy city of Najaf got out of hand and the police had to 
call in the army to control the population.22 The consul in the southern 
port city of Basra revealed that the police had escorted the British in 
Nasiriyyah out of town, and public showings of British films had been 
cancelled. He wrote, “The main British crime in the eyes of Basrawis 
was not that we attacked Egypt, but that we did so seemingly in collu-
sion with, or at least in association with the Jews and the French.”23 He 
added, “The Jewish attack on Egypt was viewed entirely emotionally 
and even the most informed and most balanced of Basrawis, some of 
whom have spent years in England, insist on believing that the Egyp-
tian armies won a great victory.” The rise of the transistor radio had 
allowed Abdel Nasser to broadcast his denunciations of Nuri al-Said 
directly to the Iraqi public, with powerful effect. British confidence 
that the Iraqi government could easily contain the minor demonstra-
tions was warranted in 1956. It could be argued, nevertheless, that 
the Baghdad regime’s de facto complaisance in the face of British and 
Israeli aggression on another Arab state, whatever pro forma denun-
ciations it may have issued, fatally undermined it.
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Events in Iraq perpetually concerned the Israelis because of its 
demographic weight and the unresolved character of the relationship 
between the two states. In winter/spring 1958, the Iraqi and Jorda-
nian monarchies explored a union to counter the nationalist union 
of Egypt and Syria in the United Arab Republic. In response, Israeli 
Foreign Minister Golda Meir expressed Tel Aviv’s anxiety to the British 
ambassador. She is said to have told him that, “Israel had no armistice 
agreement with Iraq; she was now faced with a united army and the 
prospect of Iraqi troops on her borders.”24
The anxiety over a Hashemite union was swiftly replaced by alarm 
at the July 1958 military coup and popular uprising that violently 
ended the lives of the Iraqi royal family and Prime Minister Nuri al-
Said. The former Iraqi elite’s alliance with Britain, enmity with Abdel 
Nasser, and inaction toward Israel had made it extremely unpopular.
In the event, Abd al-Karim Qasim’s regime favored Iraqi, not Pan-
Arab, nationalism. It developed a rivalry with Abdel Nasser and 
focused on internal Iraqi projects such as land reform and urban devel-
opment, rather than on foreign adventures in the Levant. The Qasim 
government was ended by a short-lived coup staged by the Arab 
nationalist Baath Party in 1963. The officers’ regime that overthrew 
the Baath late in 1963, led serially by the brothers Abd al-Salam Arif 
(until his death in 1966) and then Abd al-Rahman Arif (1966–1968), 
explored Pan-Arab alliances. Iraq played only a minor role in the Six 
Day War of 1967, although it sent 25,000 troops to support Jordan. It 
lost ten men in fighting. In reaction to strong U.S. support for Israel, 
the American embassy in Baghdad reported, “Following the outbreak 
of war in the Middle East on June 5, Iraq severed diplomatic relations 
with the United States, suspended oil shipments, refused to permit 
U.S. aircraft to overfly Iraq, and announced a boycott of U.S. goods.”25 
The alarm of the diplomatic personnel in the Iraqi capital at the public 
mood is apparent in the embassy’s report that, “All media continue 
blare reports of ‘tripartite aggression.’ American professor checking 
out Baghdad University today told by girl cashier he lucky to be leav-
ing because ‘we’re going to kill all of you.’ ”26 Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Adnan Pachachi complained with “personal bitterness” to the outgo-
ing U.S. ambassador that, “the Arabs had been misled as to what they 
could expect from the United States, or they had misled themselves.” 
He recalled the even-handed position taken by the United States dur-
ing the 1956 war, when Washington “had immediately and forcibly 
publicly stated that Israel would not be allowed any territorial gains.” 
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The disillusioned foreign minister lamented, “The United States posi-
tion is so close to that of Israel that there is no meaningful distinction 
to make.”27 It was nearly two decades before diplomatic relations were 
briefly restored with the United States.
*****
The 1967 war helped push Iraq into international isolation. Iraq refused 
to accept United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which called 
for the withdrawal of Israel from occupied Arab lands, vowing instead 
to pursue the armed struggle.28
The humiliating defeat of the Arab cause enraged the Iraqi public 
and helped open Arif to a second coup by the Baath Party, in 1968, this 
time successful. Among the first acts of the Baath government was to 
hold show trials of former officials and purported conspirators, among 
whom were nine Iraqi Jews that the regime hanged as alleged spies for 
Israel in 1969. All but a handful of the remaining Iraqi Jews fled the 
country. At the same time, a second wave of Palestinian refugees was 
forced abroad as a result of the Israeli conquest of Gaza and the West 
Bank in the 1967 war, with Iraq’s Palestinian population swelling to 
some 34,000. Unlike their compatriots in Jordan, they remained state-
less and most never gained Iraqi citizenship. In neighboring Kuwait, 
the Palestinian population burgeoned to 400,000 by 1989.
The Baath regime engaged in a highly symbolic and “demonstra-
tive” brand of diplomacy and had predictably bad relations with 
Israel.29 Frustration with American and European partisanship and 
military support for Israel was given as one source of public pressure 
on the Iraqi government to nationalize the Iraqi petroleum industry, 
thus punishing Royal Dutch Shell and the American majors Standard 
Oil (later Exxon) and Mobil.30 President Ahmad Hasan Bakr national-
ized this key resource in 1972. Iraq sent troops to support Syria during 
the 1973 war, and a force of 30,000 Iraqi troops stopped the Israelis 
from advancing from the Golan Heights further into Syrian territory. 
Baghdad aided Palestinian guerrillas, as well. Iraq and Israel, as two 
major Middle Eastern states, kept a wary eye on each other’s military 
capabilities. Secretly aided by Britain and France, and with help from 
spies in the nuclear sector in the U.S., Israel had used a heavy water 
reactor at Dimona to produce atomic weapons by the early 1970s, thus 
impelling other Middle East states to develop at least some nuclear 
expertise.
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The oil price surge of the 1970s began to turn Baathist Iraq into a 
regional power. The price of petroleum quadrupled over the decade, 
giving Iraq a staggering income of some $29 billion a year by 1980 
(up from $575 million in 197231). Most of the Gulf Arab oil states had 
tiny populations and were forced to recycle their petrodollars into 
Western investments, as their economies lacked the absorptive capac-
ity to put those vast sums of money to work locally. In contrast, Iraq 
had a relatively large population and possessed enough of a literate, 
skilled workforce to use the income from fossil fuels for the estab-
lishment of petrochemical, pharmaceutical, and other factories. With 
Egypt expelled from the Arab League because of its 1978 peace treaty 
with Israel, the steadfastly rejectionist Iraq was in a position to emerge 
as a leader of the Arab world and even, potentially, of the Non-Aligned 
Movement. A rhetorical hard line against Israel was important to Bagh-
dad’s bid for increased stature, championed after his 1979 internal 
coup by Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti.
With its vastly increased petroleum wealth, the Iraqi government 
pursued a myriad of modernization projects in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, including the building of a civilian nuclear power plant, known 
as Osirak, with French help. Although the Iraqi government implored 
Paris for a heavy water reactor, the French adamantly refused and 
insisted on building only a light water reactor. (Light water reactors 
cannot be directly used to generate fissionable material, unlike heavy 
water reactors.) Paris had also rejected Iraqi requests for a plutonium 
reprocessing facility, and without a reprocessing capacity, spent fuel 
from a light water reactor cannot be turned into a nuclear weapon.
Iraq was a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
and it allowed regular International Atomic Energy Agency inspec-
tions. Even though Osirak posed no security threat to Israel, Zionist 
leaders appear to have viewed it as a symbolic challenge as the first 
Arab reactor, and they were determined to keep Israel the sole nuclear 
state in the region. In 1981, before the nuclear plant could “go hot,” 
the Israeli air force bombed it. In response, Saddam Hussein launched 
a crash program to construct a nuclear warhead in the 1980s.32 While 
the secret post-Osirak program did violate the NPT, it was by most 
accounts a failure. United Nations inspectors discovered and disman-
tled the remnants of the program in 1992, after Iraq lost the Gulf War. 
Israel, then, formed an absolute limit to the extent of Iraqi modernity. 
The Israeli challenge, along with the Iranian one, lay behind Saddam 
Hussein’s pursuit of unconventional weapons in the 1980s, which ulti-
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mately fueled the suspicions that allowed the George W. Bush admin-
istration to overthrow him.
Israeli concerns about the growing power of Iraq as an Arab, pro-
Palestinian hydrocarbon state drove Israel to take Iran’s side in the 
Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988. Israel had been dependent upon Iranian 
petroleum during the time of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi, and the 
1979 Islamic Revolution that brought Imam Ruhollah Khomeini to 
power threatened an important Israeli fuel source. The Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran, however, also faced a problem. The revolution and the hos-
tage crisis had led to bad relations between Tehran and Washington, 
and to an American boycott of Iran. Yet many of Iran’s best weapons 
had been supplied by the United States, creating a crisis of spare parts. 
Israel covertly offered Tehran American spare parts from its own arse-
nal in return for Iranian petroleum.
Some Israeli government officials regretted that from late 1983, the 
Reagan administration had sided with Iraq rather than Iran. One way 
they offset this American policy and managed to arrange for some U.S. 
help to Iran as well was to broker the Iran-Contra deal with the Reagan 
White House. Pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Lebanon had taken a num-
ber of Americans hostage, creating a public relations problem for Rea-
gan, who had criticized former President Jimmy Carter’s impotence 
in the face of Iran’s hostage taking. The White House had also been 
blocked by the congressional Boland Amendment from using govern-
ment funding to support right-wing guerrillas in Central America. At 
the same time, Iran needed weapons to prosecute the war with Iraq. 
Although the U.S. was backing Iraq, the Reagan administration agreed 
to sell Tehran anti-aircraft and other weapons off the books, essentially 
stealing them from Pentagon warehouses. The money Khomeini paid 
to the U.S. for these weapons was then funneled to the U.S.-backed 
guerrillas in Central America. The Iranians also used their good offices 
to free American hostages in Lebanon.33 The plot, despite its Machia-
vellian elegance, backfired when it became public.
The Iran-Iraq War left the Baath regime in Iraq deeply indebted and 
the collapse of the Eastern bloc left it without a powerful patron. Iraq 
was now lacking in the resources to realize Saddam Hussein’s ambi-
tion to become a regional great power. His search for new resources, 
among other motivations, led to his invasion of Kuwait in August of 
1990. This aggression by one Arab League member against another 
had nothing to do with the Arab-Israeli struggle, but did become 
wrought up with it willy-nilly. Saddam Hussein was dismayed that the 
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Arab League condemned him for the invasion. Even old friends like 
Hosni Mubarak of Egypt joined with the Americans and the Saudis 
in announcing a determination to push him back out of Kuwait. He 
wanted to drive a wedge between the American-led coalition and the 
Arab states, reversing the rush of Egypt and Syria to provide troops for 
the war effort against him. He knew that if he could bring the Israelis 
into the war against him, the Arab regimes might be forced by public 
opinion to withdraw from the fray lest they be seen as allies of Tel Aviv 
against another Arab state. Saddam therefore ordered SCUD missile 
attacks on Israel.34 The Israeli public, afraid of being gassed, conducted 
drills and some wore gas masks in public. The Israeli Philharmonic 
even played in gas masks. Although Saddam had chemical and bio-
logical weapons stores, he simply put dumb bombs into the warheads, 
although rumors sometimes flew in Israel that they contained nerve 
gas. If his goal were to provoke an Israeli attack on Iraq, rather than to 
accomplish any genuine military objective in Israel itself, dumb bombs 
would do the trick. The Israelis at points seemed poised to enter the 
war, but were dissuaded by strong-arming from the Bush administra-
tion. Bush thereby kept his coalition together and was able to arrange 
for Egyptian troops to be the ones who entered Kuwait City first, mak-
ing for a positive image in the Arab world.
The SCUD attacks raised to a fever pitch anxiety about personal 
safety among Israelis. Such attacks, even though they did little real 
damage, became an element in the demographic warfare between 
Israelis and Palestinians. Since Israelis can easily emigrate to Western 
Europe and the United States, Israeli leaders are perpetually concerned 
about security threats that might provoke substantial out-migration 
or might discourage further in-migration. To calm the nerves of the 
Israeli public, Bush Sr. provided Patriot anti-missile missiles to Israel, 
which, while of limited utility, in fact did have a positive psychological 
effect.35
The Gulf War had two major impacts on the Arab-Israeli question 
beyond the SCUD attacks. Before the invasion, Saddam Hussein had 
pledged a strong stance against Israel. As a result, the PLO leader-
ship and the Palestinian public in the Levant largely rallied to the side 
of Iraq, as had huge North African crowds. In Kuwait, the attitudes 
were markedly different, since 200,000 Palestinians fled Kuwait during 
the Iraqi occupation, with some joining the underground resistance 
to Baghdad (the Iraqis imprisoned 5,000 Palestinians for opposing 
them). After the expulsion of the Iraqi army from Kuwait, the Kuwaiti 
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government accused the Palestinians of collaborating with Baghdad 
during the occupation, tarring all with the same brush. Of Kuwait’s 
population of about 1.2 million, half were non-citizen guest workers, 
and the majority of those (400,000) were Palestinians. They had consti-
tuted about a third of the population. In March 1991, those remaining 
were forced out. Some 300,000 of these Palestinians went to Jordan, 
while about 30,000 went to the West Bank. (Most had originated in the 
West Bank or Israel, but they preferred living in Jordan to living under 
Israeli military occupation.) The Palestinian exodus from the Gulf sub-
stantially weakened the PLO, to which their contributions had been 
important.36
The other major impact of the Gulf War on Arab-Israeli affairs was 
that the Bush Sr. administration took advantage of the victory and the 
positive feelings toward the U.S. in the region to push for a compre-
hensive peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. Secretary 
of State James Baker campaigned for the Madrid peace conference 
in fall of 1991, and then worked to unseat the Likud government of 
Shamir, which he viewed as expansionist and unhelpful.37 The Oslo 
peace process and the creation of the Palestinian Authority thus owed 
a great deal to the Gulf War’s impact on the Palestinians, with their loss 
of remittances from Kuwait probably making them more willing to 
compromise, and American prestige from the victory helping to con-
vince Israelis to unseat the Likud.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 had some connection to the Arab-
Israeli conflict, although the precise weight that should be given to that 
connection is in dispute.38 The Neoconservatives, made up primarily 
(though not exclusively) of Jewish-American politicians and policy-
makers who had moved to the right in the 1980s, had argued forcefully 
for regime change in Iraq since mid-decade. Neoconservative figures 
like Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, and David Wurmser broached the 
desirability of a war to overthrow the Baath regime in Iraq in a White 
Paper they wrote for far right-wing Israeli politician Binyamin Netan-
yahu in 1996.39 They argued for reviving the Hashemite monarchy as 
a means to undermine and overthrow the Baath regime in Syria. They 
also expressed the hope that the restored Hashemite king, as a Sayyid 
(descendant of the Prophet Muhammad), would have moral authority 
among the Shiites of southern Lebanon and so could curb the popu-
larity of the Khomeinist Hizbullah party. These prescriptions were 
a fantasy and impractical, but they did signal a new determination 
among some of the more militant Israel lobbies to push for a dramatic 
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change in the geopolitics of the Middle East by promoting regime 
change in Iraq. Because of the Iraqi Baath’s aggressive invasions of Iran 
and Kuwait, its massive political repression of Kurds and Shiites, its 
violations of the NPT, and a series of United Nations Security Council 
condemnations, it was the weakest of the Arab states confronting Israel 
and the easiest regime in the region to overthrow.
*****
The Neoconservative Project for the New American Century (PNAC), 
established in 1997 by William Kristol and Robert Kagan, involved 
many of the authors of the “Clean Break” White Paper. It had American 
military action against Iraq among its primary goals and its support-
ers pressured the Clinton administration to launch military opera-
tions. When George W. Bush came to power in January 2001, he, Vice 
President Dick Cheney, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
appointed many of the “Clean Break” authors and PNAC members to 
high positions throughout the Defense and State Departments and in 
Cheney’s vice presidential staff. From these perches inside the Execu-
tive, they were able to collude with Iraqi expatriates to manufacture 
evidence that Saddam Hussein still had an active research program 
and stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, and that his regime 
was directly connected to Al-Qaeda.
The Neoconservatives were clearly obsessed with Israeli security. 
That obsession drove much of their case against Iraq, which was dif-
ficult to configure as a genuine threat to the United States. The Israeli 
public also overwhelmingly approved of the notion of a war on Iraq, 
and Prime Minister Ariel Sharon denounced Iraq to the Knesset as 
the biggest danger to the Zionist state. The outbreak of the second 
Intifada in the fall of 2000, and the support that Saddam Hussein alleg-
edly offered the families of suicide bombers, sharpened Israeli con-
cerns about Baghdad. Israeli radio reported in late 2002 that, “In recent 
weeks, Iraq has dramatically stepped up its transfer of funds to the ter-
ritories. Since the beginning of the Intifada, Iraq has transferred tens of 
millions of dollars to the Palestinians to encourage terrorist attacks.”40
While the Israel lobbies and Israel itself strongly supported regime 
change in Baghdad, the effort was spearheaded by Bush and Cheney, 
both of whom had a background in the U.S. oil industry. Given that the 
top decision-makers had earlier been at odds with the Israel lobbies 
over issues such as sanctions on Iran or the expansion of Israeli colo-
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nies in the West Bank, their alliance with the Neoconservatives must 
be seen as an instrumental new development from 2000 onward. Thus, 
the American attack on Iraq is best understood as deriving from an 
alliance of U.S. petroleum interests with the Israel lobbies.
The modern history of Iraq has been unusually shaped by foreign 
interventions, both direct and indirect. As an Arab Muslim country 
born of the Ottoman experience but midwifed by the British Empire, 
it faced repeated British intervention in its domestic affairs. The Iraqi 
petroleum industry and Iraq’s key strategic position as a route between 
the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf (important to British commu-
nications with India until 1947) drove initial British interventions. The 
British project in Mandate Palestine, of creating a homeland for Jews in 
a densely populated Arab region, stoked growing passions in Iraq. The 
betrayal of the Palestinians by the British, as most Iraqis understood 
it, served as a constant reminder of Western perfidy and a poignant 
symbol for Iraqis’ own resentments at being under London’s thumb. 
The British and the Zionists misunderstood this growing nationalism 
in Iraq as intertwined with German or fascist influence, for which there 
is little convincing evidence and which the reports of contemporary 
British diplomats generally call into question. Rather, Iraqi elites in 
the late 1930s and early 1940s sought greater autonomy from Britain, 
including through (somewhat negligible) trade and diplomatic rela-
tions with Axis powers. The Iraqi masses sympathized with Palestin-
ians being displaced by the influx of Zionist colonists. The attempt 
to move toward neutrality among the combatants in World War II 
was interpreted by British and Zionist observers as a pro-Nazi policy, 
although evidence for active support for Nazism as an ideology is 
lacking. The British need for Iraqi petroleum and fear of having an 
important communications route to India cut off led them to virtually 
recolonize Iraq in 1941.
The alliance of a powerful section of the Iraqi elite with Britain, 
exemplified by Emir Abd al-Ilah and sometime Prime Minister Nuri 
al-Said, became increasingly unpopular in large part because of the 
events in Israel and Palestine from 1948 forward. The rise of Israel 
and the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their 
homes created a backlash against Iraqi Jews that ultimately deprived 
the country of an important force for multiculturalism and cosmopoli-
tanism. Baghdad’s refusal to intervene on Egypt’s side in 1956 contrib-
uted powerfully to the discontents that produced the 1958 coup and 
popular uprising that ended the pro-British monarchy. Likewise, the 
Macalester International  Vol. 23
20
limited Iraqi government involvement in the 1967 war and the humili-
ating defeat inflicted on Arab forces by the Israelis paved the way for 
the 1968 Baathist coup against the Arif clique. The turn of Iraq from 
pro-Western monarchy to Iraqi and Arab nationalism was not solely 
caused by public passions on the Palestine question, but the latter was 
one important catalyst for this sea change.
From 1968 onward, the Baath government was largely in synchrony 
with public opinion in Iraq on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and on 
the question of imperialism. Iraq’s nationalization of the oil industry 
in 1972 and its vigorous participation in the 1973 war on Syria’s side 
bolstered its Arab nationalist credentials. Baath modernization and 
industrialization drives raised standards of living, and the oil price 
revolution of the 1970s abruptly made Iraq into a wealthy, rapidly 
developing regional power. With Egypt neutralized after the 1978 
Camp David Accords, Iraq emerged as a leader of the Arab bloc and 
one of the few military powers that could hope to challenge Israeli 
hegemony in the Levant. Israel responded to the Iraqi challenge by 
bombing the Osirak reactor and by forming an alliance of convenience 
with Iraq’s primary enemy, Khomeinist Iran. Despite strident rhetoric 
on Israel, however, the Baath regime mainly spent blood and treasure 
on a quest for aggrandizement through the conquest of territories and 
the acquisition of petroleum resources from its two neighbors, Iran 
and Kuwait. Whatever support Saddam Hussein may have sometimes 
given the Palestinians, his reckless invasion of Kuwait and the subse-
quent expulsion of Palestinians from that country did more to weaken 
them as a financial and political force than anything since their expul-
sion from Israel in 1948. Saddam Hussein’s decision to fire SCUD mis-
siles at Israel in January 1991, in hopes of drawing Israel into the war 
against him and thereby breaking up the alliance of the United States 
and the Arab League against his annexation of Kuwait, may well have 
sealed his doom. Along with his subsequent financial support for Pal-
estinians, this action convinced the Israel lobbies in the United States 
and important segments of the Israeli elite and public that Baathist 
Iraq formed the greatest menace to Israel in the region and that only 
regime change could ensure the survival of the Zionist state. Baathist 
threats, backed by missiles that could reach Israel and a record of 
attempting to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, 
formed an element in the psychological dimension of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The long shadow cast by Baghdad had the potential to spur 
Israeli emigration or slow immigration from the former Soviet Union. 
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Baathist Iraq’s financial support for the Palestinians may not only have 
enabled guerrilla and terrorist attacks but also stiffened Palestinian 
resolve and made it less likely that Palestinians would leave the West 
Bank because of economic desperation. While Iraqi involvement in the 
Palestinian-Israeli conflict was only one impetus for the 2003 American 
war on Iraq, the Israel lobbies played an important role in fomenting 
the war that opened a new chapter in Iraqi history. Palestine, Iraq, and 
Israel have been profoundly intertwined in modern history. The idea 
that “the road to peace in Jerusalem runs through Baghdad,” promul-
gated by the Neoconservatives in early 2003, was among the more 
profoundly wrong political slogans ever manufactured in history. That 
regime change, war, and political instability in Iraq have frequently 
been deeply influenced and sometimes even driven by the Israeli-Pal-
estinian struggle, however, seems irrefragable. •
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